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China’s reform worked and produced one of the most impressive growth in the largest
developing and transition economy in the world in the past twenty-two years.  That China has
managed to grow so rapidly despite the absence of many conventional institutions such as rule of
law and secure private property rights is puzzling.  To understand how reform works in a
developing and transition economy that has great growth potential, it is not enough to study the
conventional “best-practice institutions” as a desirable goal.  One should also study how feasible,
imperfect institutions have evolved to complement the initial conditions and to function as
stepping stones in the transition toward the goal.  Underlying China’s reform is a serial of
institutional changes concerning the market, firms, and the government in the novel form of
“transitional institutions.”  These institutions succeed when they achieve two objectives at the
same time: to improve economic efficiency by unleashing the standard forces of incentives and
competition on the one hand, and to make the reform a win-win game and thus interest
compatible for those in power on the other.1
1.  A Reform That Worked But Puzzling
In the last twenty years of the 20
th century, China has transformed itself from a poor,
centrally planned economy to a lower middle-income, emerging market economy.  With total
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing at an average annual rate of more than 9 percent,
China’s per capita GDP has more than quadrupled during this period.  The benefits of growth
were also shared by the people on a broad basis: the number of people living in absolute poverty
has been substantially reduced from over 250 million to about 50 million, a decline from a one-
third to a twenty-fifth of its population; and life expectancy has increased from 64 in the 1970s to
over 70 in the late 1990s.  Both the formal statistics and casual tourist impressions tell the same
story: China’s growth is real.  Two decades ago, few economists would have bet on the outcome
in China today.  At the time, coming out of the disastrous decade of the Cultural Revolution,
China was poor, over-populated, short of human capital and natural resources, and was
constrained by the hostile ideology against markets and powerful oppositions against radical
reform.  Growth of this kind under such initial conditions is a surprise.
China’s phenomenal growth is not just another successful growth story because China is
not a “typical” country, although in cross-country regressions China can only represent one data
point, same as Singapore or Ireland or Botswana.  China is the largest transition and developing
economy.  As a transition economy from plan to market, China has a population three times more
than all other transition economies combined, including the 15 former Soviet Republics.  As of
2000, its larger-than-US$1 trillion economy was already bigger than all other transition
economies combined.  As a developing economy, China has the population almost three times of
all eight high-performing East Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,     
1 In terms of purchasing power parity, China’s current per capita GDP is about 1/10 of that of the U.S.
(roughly speaking, $3,000 vs. $30,000).  Because China has the population approximately five times as
large as the U.S., China’s total GDP, in terms of purchasing power parity, is about one-half of that of the
U.S. at the present time.  If China continues to grow five percentage points faster than the U.S., then
China’s total GDP will be larger than that of the U.S. in 15 years.
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Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.  It has managed to match the growth record of
these economies during their heyday, but on a population size much larger.  The cumulative
effects of the two decades’ growth are significant when comparing China with its two largest
neighbors:  On total GDP terms, in 1988 China was less than half of Russia but ten years later
Russia was less than half of China.  On per capita basis, two decades ago China and India were
about equal, but now China is about twice as rich as India.
China’s growth is unlikely to end any time soon.  In the first half of 2001, despite the
global slowdown, China’s economy continued to grow at an annual rate of about eight percent. 
Defying the perception that China has reached a plateau of growth, more and more economists
start to believe that the best part of China’s growth has not come yet.  With the imminent entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), they suspect that China’s economy is perhaps on the
verge of the next boom.
According to Maddison's (1998) calculation, China might overtake the United States in
total GDP in terms of “purchasing power parity” by 2015.
1  If Maddison is right, China would be
the only economy, excluding European Union, possible of surpassing the U.S. economy in the
next two decades.  And this would make China the largest economy in the world, regaining its
historical position which it lost in the middle of the 19
th century.  No wonder Lawrence Summers
speculated in the early 1990s:  “It may be that when the history of the late 20th century is written
in a hundred years the most significant event will be the revolutionary change in China”3
(Summers, 1992).
On the ground of economic growth and improving living standard, there is no question
that China’s reform has worked.  But this reform is puzzling.  In the early 1990s, the economics
profession and policy makers reached a “surprising degree of unanimity” (Summers, 1991) on
the recipe for transition form plan to market.  Simply put, it calls for stabilization, liberalization,
and privatization, following political democratization.  Although many economists may not
consider this recipe as sufficient to guarantee a good reform, few would question its necessity. 
Theoretically, it is difficult to imagine how a reform would work without these essential
ingredients.  Empirically, the fresh memory of the frustrated reform experience in Hungary,
Poland, and the former Soviet Union prior to 1990 has reminded reformers how a reform would
fail if not following these recommendations.
The Chinese path of reform and its associated rapid growth is puzzling because it seems
to defy the necessity part of this conventional wisdom.  Although China has adopted many of the
policies advocated by economists, such as being open to trade and foreign investment and
sensitive to macroeconomic stability, violations of the standard prescriptions are striking.  For the
most part of the past two decades, China's reform succeeded without complete liberalization,
without privatization, and without democratization.  One might have reasoned that coexistence of
the planning mechanism with partial liberalization would only cause more distortion and become
a source of disruption, not growth.  Without privatization and secure private property rights, one
might conclude that there could not be genuine market incentives.  Without democracy,
economic reform lacks a political basis and commitment to a market and thus is vulnerable.  The4
actual performance of the Chinese reform provides a striking contrast to these expectations.  Why
has China grown so fast when conditions thought to be necessary for growth were absent, asked
Blanchard and Fischer (1993).
It is not surprising that China’s reform has been viewed as an anomaly and thus not has
been appreciated by mainstream economists.  For example, From Plan to Market: World
Development Report 1996 on transition economies (World Bank, 1996) only gave China short
shrift because it couldn't figure out where to put China on the various measurement parameters. 
China simply does not fit into the general description of the report.
Those who do not find China’s reform puzzling often misunderstand it.  Two types of
misperceptions or myths of China’s economic success are common.  The first is to regard foreign
direct investment (FDI) and exports as the driving force for China’s success.  In this connection
the roles of overseas Chinese and of Hong Kong and Taiwan are often emphasized.  The
simplicity of the argument adds to its power, and the vicarious message that it is the foreigners
and foreign markets that made China grow finds appreciation outside China.  However, the
argument immediately loses its plausibility as soon as one considers a parallel experience in
Germany.  If Hong Kong or Taiwan could play such a powerful role on mainland China, West
Germany should have been even more effective on East Germany, given that West Germany is
much larger and stronger than Taiwan and Hong Kong combined and East Germany is way
smaller than mainland China.
The role of FDI in China is vastly over stated in the press.  For the entire 1980s, FDI in
China was tiny.  FDI only started to increase substantially in 1993, and at its peak it accounted
for about 10 percent of total investment.  On per capita basis, China's FDI was not high by the5
international standard.  It is true that China’s exports expanded very fast but it cannot be the main
story.  The direct contribution of foreign trade and investment to large countries cannot be
quantitatively as important as to those small countries.  Like FDI, China’s exports were very
concentrated in coastal provinces.  However, contrary to a popular perception, China's growth
was not just a phenomena of coastal provinces--it is across-board, both coastal and inland. 
Inland provinces grow fast while coastal provinces just faster.  Anyone who have ever traveled to
inland cities such as Xi’an or Guiyang cannot fail to notice their vibrant local economies. 
Indeed, if each China’s province is accounted as an economy, about 20 out of top 30 growth
regions in the world in the past two decades would be provinces in China, a lot of which did not
receive much foreign investment and did not depend on exports.  Table 1 shows GDP growth by
province in China and refutes the perception that growth in China is only coastal.
If focusing on FDI and foreign trade leads to a downplay of the entire reform process and
of the role of indigenous institutions, then the simple-minded view on trade and foreign
investment would create obstacles to the understanding of growth in any country.  This is
because the effectiveness of openness has to work through the corresponding internal changes. 
Russia became very open after reform, more so than China, but neither higher growth nor more
FDI ensued.  Even in small East Asian countries, the export-oriented policy worked through
domestic changes on investment and human capital accumulation.  Therefore, it could well not
be the export that drives growth, but the same forces of domestic changes drive both export and
domestic growth.
The second common misperception of China’s success is to attribute it exclusively to the
agricultural reform in the early 1980s.  To be sure, China’s agricultural reform was a huge6
success.  And the reason for it is easily a consensus because it is pretty much a standard story of
family farming plus market liberalization, although researches have shown that it is more
complicated than that.  For example, there seemed to be significant contributions from the rural
R&D and infrastructure investments made in the 1970s on the agriculture productivity growth in
the 1980s; and the state institutions for marketing also played important roles in rural
development (Huang and Rozelle, 1996; and Rozelle, 1996).  Nevertheless, economists are
generally comfortable with the Chinese agriculture reform because it fits well their models of the
world.
What becomes a myth is when one regards the agriculture reform as the only reform
success in China.  Often it carries two implicit messages: China did not do well in non-
agriculture sectors because it did not follow the conventional advice, and China did well in
agriculture reform because it was -- and still is -- a poor, agricultural country.  The truth is that
the agricultural reform is the first reform success in China, and its bigger achievements lie
elsewhere.  At the outset of reform in the late 1970s, over 70 percent of China’s labor force was
employed in agricluture.  By 2000, China’s agriculture labor force already declined to below the
50 percent mark, which is impossible without successful development outside the agriculture
sector.  In the late 1990s, the agricultural share of China's GDP was as 16 percent, about the same
level as that in Poland and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s.  Table 2 provides evidence
showing that most China’s growth came from the non-agricultural sector -- the industrial and
tertiary sectors.
There could be important indirect effects of the agricultural sector on non-agriculture
sectors.  For example, the successful agriculture reform provides sources of savings and labor to7
boost or even drives industrialization.  But in order for this mechanism to work, reforms of the
non-agriculture sector is necessary, and how China managed it went beyond the agriculture
success.  The fact that today China is no longer a poor, agriculture country has demonstrated that
the main success of China’s reform is outside the agriculture sector.
One cannot understand China’s growth without understanding how its reform worked in
the domestic, non-agriculture sector, which is the focus of this paper.
2.  Perspectives on Institutions
In their standard way of thinking, economists consider labor, physical capital, human
capital, and productivity as the proximate determinants of growth.  But factor accumulation and
productivity changes are endogenous, depending on the improvement in technology, allocative
efficiency, and incentives, which in turn are shaped by institutions.  The advocates of New
Institutional Economics (Coase, 1992; North, 1997; and Williamson, 1994) recognize that a good
market economy requires not only “getting prices right,” but also “getting property rights right”
and “getting institutions right.”  This is because property rights, and institutions in general, set
the rules to affect the behavior of economic agents in a fundamental way.
The institutional economists thus regard the conventional wisdom of transition focusing
on stabilization, liberalization, and privatization as inadequate, missing the important
institutional dimension.  To them, a set of institutions are critical for sustained growth, including
secure private property rights protected by the rule of law; impartial enforcement of contracts
through an independent judiciary; appropriate government regulations to foster market
competition; effective corporate governance; transparent financial systems, etc.  The fact that all8
of them can be readily found in the developed economies, especially in the U.S., implies that they
are “best practice” institutions.
Economists then use these institutions as a benchmark to judge transition and developing
economies, and often find huge institutional gaps.  These findings then serve three purposes. 
First, they generate a diagnosis of the deficiency of institutions in developing and transition
economies.  Second, they are used to explain why these economies perform poorly, confirming
the central hypothesis that institutions matter.  Third, they lead to recommendations for
institution building: if the economy has weak property rights, clarify them; a weak financial
system? strengthen it; a bad law? change it; and a corrupt legal system? clean it up.
This “menu perspective” on institutions is useful in providing a benchmark of best
practice institutions with which today’s most developed economies have achieved to the
development frontier.  But this perspective does not provide enough intellectual power for
insightful investigations of how reform worked (or did not work) in many developing and
transition economies.  Compare China with Russia for the last decade.  Neither of them had the
rule of law, secure private property rights, effective corporate governance, or strong financial
system.  But the two exhibited a huge performance difference, which obviously cannot be
attributed to the presence or absence of the best practice institutions.
The same kind of problem also arises from the cross-country regressions incorporating
institutional development indices.  For example, the World Bank study Beyond Washington
Consensus: Institutions Matter (Burki and Perry, 1998) gets serious on institutions.  It compiled a
“composite institutional development index” for each country according to a menu of institutions
such as the rule of law, financial institutions, ownership, public administration, etc.  The study9
carries out cross-country growth regressions using this index to find out positive associations
between economic growth and institutional development.  While the cross-country regressions
are useful in estimating the magnitudes of the effects of explanatory variables on growth, they
only do this right when the latter are correctly measured and truly exogenous.  Otherwise they
lead to biased estimations and/or leave large residuals unexplained.  Indeed, China, together with
Taiwan and Chile, is an outlier in the regression showing the relationship between institutional
development and economic growth (Figure 1.1.a, Burki and Perry, 1998).  China is again an
outlier in the more refined regression of the “true” partial coefficient between institutional
development and growth (Figure 1.1.b, Burki and Perry, 1998), together with Thailand,
Indonesia, and Korea.  In all these cross-country regressions, China’s performance is too high
relative to its index value of institutional development.  This is not too surprising because the
measurement of the institutional development index is simple-minded and the underlying
variable is likely not exogenous.
Recognizing the importance of institutions is only a beginning.  A major problem in the
study of reform in developing and transition economies is not that it neglects institutions or even
lacks enough attention to institutions.  Not any more.  The problem is the naive perspective on
institutions.  The naive perspective often confuses the goal (i.e., where to finish up) with the
process (i.e., how to get there) and thus tends to ignore the intriguing issues of transition paths
connecting the starting point and the goal.  It is as if one neglects the “transition equations” (or
“equations of motion”) and the “initial conditions” in dynamic programming.  Although building
best practice institutions is a desirable goal, getting institutions right is a process involving
incessant changes interacting with initial conditions.  The difference between China and Russia is10
not at all that China has established best practice institutions and that Russia did not.  The
difference lies in the institutions in transition.
To understand how reforms work in developing and transition economies, we need to
broaden our perspective on institutions.  It is not enough to study the familiar forms of
conventional institutions found in the most developed economies as a desirable goal; it is also
essential to study the variety of unfamiliar forms of institutions in transition.  The distinction
between the conventional, best practice institutions and the transitional institutions is important. 
Gerschenkron (1962) made a crucial point in his studies of economic development of latecomers
such as Germany in the 19
th century: the latecomers need to make special arrangements to
compensate for their backwardness and they can find ways to do so.  In parallel, the broadened
perspective on institutions takes a dynamic, not static, views on institutions.  It recognizes that
the real challenge of reform facing transition and developing countries is not so much about
knowing where to end up, but about searching for a feasible path toward the goal.  Therefore, it
focuses on transitional institutions, not best practice institutions.  In the metaphor of mountain
climbing, although the peak of a mountain offers the best view, mountaineers enjoy a better and
better view along the path toward the peak.  For mountaineers, the most challenging job is not the
study of the peak, but the search for a feasible path toward the peak.  Like Shleifer and
Triesman’s (1999) study of Russian transition, our study of China’s transition is not about what
is desirable, but about what is feasible.
Compared to the developed economies, the backwardness resulting from the initial
institutional conditions in transition and developing economies can be both disadvantageous and
advantageous for growth.  On the one hand, the immediate effects of the initial institutional11
conditions are generally not hospitable to growth in most transition and developing economies. 
Moreover, although these countries can take advantage of being latecomers to shorten the time of
change, they may not be able to make and complete all the changes in a short period of time. 
This is disadvantageous for growth.  On the other hand, however, because the adverse initial
institutions created myriads of distortions, these economies usually enjoy great growth potential
once institutions are changed to remove these distortions.  In this regard the most striking
examples are former centrally planned economies.  These economies started reform from an
extremely inefficient status quo.  They operated not only far away from the Pareto frontier due to
the enormous allocative distortions, but also deep inside the production possibility set because of
poor incentives.  Huge room existed for efficiency improvement, which might generate great
growth opportunity not seen in the developed economies.  Thus the central question for many
transition and developing countries is how to make institutional changes to realize the great
growth potential when the initial condition has myriads of distortions.
Underlying China’s reform is a serial of institutional changes in the novel form of
transitional institutions.  These institutions work because they achieve two objectives at the same
time -- they improve economic efficiency on the one hand, and make the reform a win-win game
and interest compatible for those in power on the other.  And they take into consideration of
China’s specific initial conditions.  At one level, one could argue that China’s transitional
institutions merely unleashed the standard forces of incentives, hard budget constraints, and
competition.  This is true, but such an economic rationale is not enough.  The transitional
institutions are not created solely for increasing the size of a pie, they are also created to reflect
the distributional concerns of how the enlarged pie is divided and the political concerns of how12
the interests of those in power are served.  Rudimentary political logic readily predicts the
existence of inefficiency, but it has difficulties in explaining why inefficient institutions are
replaced by more efficient ones.  China’s reform shows that when the growth potential is large,
with intelligence and will, reformers can devise efficiency improving institutional reforms to
benefit all, including and especially those in power.  There is apparently a larger room than we
thought for institutional innovations to simultaneously address both the economic and political
concerns, that is, to make a reform efficiency improving and interest compatible for those in
power.
The general principle of efficiency-improving and interest-compatible institutional
change is simple, but the specific forms and mechanisms of transitional institutions often are not. 
Successful institutional reforms usually are not a straightforward copy of best practice
institutions.  They need not be and sometimes should not be.  They need not be because huge
room exists for efficiency improvement that does not require fine-tuning at the beginning.  They
should not be because many dimensions of the initial conditions are country and context specific
that require special arrangements to accommodate.  Therefore, inevitably, transitional institutions
display a variety of non-standard forms.  Furthermore, because these institutions are often
responses to the initial institutional distortions, the mechanisms of their functioning can be
intricate.  Understanding these mechanisms sometimes needs to appeal to the seemingly counter-
intuitive “second-best argument,” which states that removing one distortion may be counter-
productive in the presence of another distortion.  For all these reasons, studying institutions in
transition requires careful, and sometimes imaginative, analysis.
In this paper we study the general principle and the specific mechanisms underlying13
China’s transitional institutions through the analysis of four successful reforms and one failure. 
Together, these five examples cover a broad spectrum of institutional reforms of the market,
firms, and the government.
The first example is about market liberalization through the so-called “dual-track”
approach under which prices were liberalized at the margin while inframarginal plan prices and
quotas were maintained.  This reform is unconventional but shows in the simplest way of how a
reform can simultaneously improve efficiency and protect existing rents.  The invention of the
dual-track reveals both the economic and political rationale, and also illustrates how the market-
oriented reform can utilize the existing institutions, which were designed for central planning.
The second example concerns an innovative ownership form of firms – local government
ownership in general and rural Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) in particular.  This
ownership form is not standard -- it is neither private nor state (i.e., national government) owned. 
Yet TVEs, despite their non-standard ownership, have been China’s growth engine until the mid-
1990s.  The non-standard ownership form worked to improve efficiency in an adverse
environment characterized by insecure private property rights.  At the same time, the equity stake
of local governments serves both the interests of local and national governments by giving them
higher share of revenue relative to the standard private ownership form.
The third example is on how to make fiscal federalism productive.  China’s fiscal
contracting between the central and local governments has worked to provide the incentives for
local governments to pursue economic prosperity.  By granting high marginal retention rates, this
innovative arrangement has aligned the interests of local governments with local business, and
played a fundamental role in turning local governments into “helping hands” of local business. 14
Local governments responded to incentives by supporting productive non-state enterprises and
reforming non-productive state enterprises.
The fourth example is about how to constrain the government in order to protect private
incentives in the absence of rule of law.  The institution of anonymous banking is not only
unconventional but also against the recommended principle of transparency.  But it has an
economic logic: when other institutional means is not working, it serves as a commitment device
to limiting government predation by reducing the amount of information available to it.  The
government accepts such a constraint because it benefits from the revenue out of the banking
system through its control over interest rate and capital flow.  Although such a practice of
financial repression is against the usual policy recommendations, it plays a crucial role in
inducing the government to give up discretionary taxes on individuals.
Not all China’s reforms worked.  One miserable failure is the reform of large-scaled state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).  After many experiments still no reforms on these SOEs have been
found to improve economic efficiency and to make it interest compatible for those in power.  The
institution of Party appointment of top managers is a key obstacle.  This failure reform is very
costly to China.  But fortunately it is not fatal, as SOEs now account for less than one quarter of
the entire economy and their role is diminishing.
3.  Creating the Market: A Dual-Track Approach to Liberalization
The simplest way to demonstrate how China's reform worked is through an illustration of
the dual track approach to market liberalization (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000).  It highlights the
general principle underlying this innovative, transitional institution in the most obvious way:15
making reform efficiency improving and interest compatible.  It also shows how the initial
conditions play a role in implementing the reform, including how to use the existing institutions.
It is well known that the essential building block of a market system is allocating resource
according to free market prices.  An essential ingredient of any market-oriented reform involves
price liberalization.  The Eastern European experience has shown two alternative approaches.  In
the first approach, practiced in Hungary for example after its 1968 reform, bureaucrats set prices
administratively, supposedly in accordance with market supply and demand.  But in reality,
prices were set through bureaucratic bargaining, often to serve the political objectives of
bureaucrats such as making state firms afloat (Kornai, 1986).  Such reform satisfies bureaucrats’
interests, but does not improve efficiency in any significant way because prices are not really
determined by the market.  This approach proved a failure.  After 1990, Eastern European
countries have adopted a standard approach: prices are freed in one stroke and determined solely
by the market.
China adopted a third, unconventional approach to market liberalization known as the
dual-track approach.  Its basic principle is as follows.  Under the plan track, economic agents are
assigned rights to and obligations for fixed quantities of goods at fixed planned prices as
specified in the pre-existing plan.  At the same time, a market track is introduced under which
economic agents participate in the market at free market prices, provided that they fulfill their
obligations under the pre-existing plan.  In essence, prices were liberalized at the margin while
inframarginal plan prices and quotas were maintained for some time before being phased out. 
Clearly this approach differed from the two approaches experienced by the Eastern European
countries: it differs from their experience prior to 1990 because real market prices and markets as16
a resource allocation institution were created immediately.  It was also different from their
experience after 1990 because of the continued plan track.
The first implication of the dual-track approach is political: it represents a mechanism for
the implementation of a reform without creating losers.  The introduction of the market track
provides the opportunity for economic agents who participate in it to be better off, whereas the
maintenance of the plan track provides implicit transfers to compensate potential losers from the
market liberalization by protecting the status quo rents under the pre-existing plan.  This can be
seen easily from the special case of efficient rationing and efficient planned supply, that is, the
planned output is allocated to users with the highest willingness to pay and the planned supply is
delivered by suppliers with the lowest marginal costs.  Dual-track liberalization means that
planned quantity continues to be delivered at plan price but any additional quantity can be sold
freely in the market.  With the dual track, the surpluses of the rationed users and the planned
suppliers remain exactly the same.  At the same time the new users and suppliers outside the plan
are together better off.  In comparison, the single track approach to liberalization in general has
distributional consequences that cannot guarantee an outcome without losers.
The second implication of the dual track approach is economical: it always improves
efficiency.  Moreover, as the compensatory transfers are inframarginal, the dual-track approach
may achieve allocative efficiency too.  This can be seen most obviously in the special case of
efficient rationing and efficient planned supply.  In this case, because there is no inefficiency
under the planned track by assumption, the efficient market track matching the residual demand
and supply then implies the efficiency of the overall allocation.  In a more general case of
inefficient rationing and/or inefficient planned supply, the kind of market liberalization as17
described above cannot achieve efficiency although it always improves efficiency.  However,
efficiency can still be achieved under full market liberalization under which market resales of
plan-allocated goods and market purchases by planned suppliers for fulfilling planned delivery
quotas are permitted after the fulfillment of the obligations of planned suppliers and rationed
users under the plan (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000).  This type of transactions take many
common forms in practice, for examples, subcontracting by inefficient planned suppliers to more
efficient non-planned suppliers, and labor reallocation when workers in inefficient enterprises
keep the housing while taking a new job in more efficient firms.  In both examples, after
fulfilling the obligations under the plan (planned delivery of supply and welfare support through
housing subsidies respectively), the market track functions to undo the inefficiency of the plan
track.
The dual track approach to market liberalization is an example of reform making best use
of existing institutions.  First, it utilizes efficiently the existing information embedded in the
original plan (i.e., existing rents distribution) and thus its implementation does not require
additional information.  Second, it also enforces the plan through the existing plan institutions
and does not need additional institutions.  Enforcement of the plan track is crucial for preserving
the pre-existing rents.  However, contrary to common understanding of the relationship between
state power and reform, state enforcement power is needed here not to implement an unpopular
reform, but to carry out one that creates only winners, no losers.
Agricultural market liberalization followed the dual-track approach.  The commune (and
later the households) was assigned the obligation to sell a fixed quantity of output to the state
procurement agency as previously mandated under the plan at predetermined plan prices and to18
pay a fixed tax to the government.  It also had the right to receive a fixed quantity of inputs,
principally chemical fertilizers, from state-owned suppliers at predetermined plan prices.  Subject
to fulfilling these conditions, the commune was free to produce and sell whatever it considered
profitable, and to retain any profit.  Moreover, the commune and households could purchase
grain (or other) outputs from the market for resale to the state to fulfill its responsibility.  As
Table 3 shows, under the dual-track, the state procurement of domestically produced grains
between 1978 and 1988 remained essentially fixed, with 47.8 million tons in 1978 and 50.5
million ton in 1988, while total domestic grain production increased from 304.8 million ton to
394.1 million ton, almost a one-third increase.
Industrial market liberalization also shows how markets could grow out of plans (Byrd,
1991; Naughton, 1995).  For coal, China's principal energy source, the planned delivery was
increased somewhat from 329 million tons in 1981 to 427 million tons in 1989 (mainly because
new state coal mines were opened), but the market track increased dramatically from 293 million
tons to 628 million tons in the same period.  The increments came mainly from small rural coal
mines run by individuals and TVEs.  For steel, another China's major industrial material, the plan
track was quite stable in absolute terms, but the share of plan allocation fell from 52 percent in
1981 to 30 percent in 1990.  Unlike coal, the supply response in steel came mainly from large
SOEs rather than small non-state firms.  In the cases of both coal and steel, because the plan
track was basically "frozen," the economy was able to grow out of the plan on the basis of the
market track expansion by state or non-state firms.
Labor market development follows a similar pattern.  Table 3 shows that employment in
the non-state sector increased from 48.9 million to 204.85 million in 1994.  In contrast, total19
employment in the state sector, including civil servants in government agencies and non-profit
organizations, increased only from 74.51 million to 112.14 million.  Furthermore, within the state
sector, there are two tracks as well.  Beginning in 1980, while pre-existing employees maintained
their permanent employment status, most new hires in the state sector were made under the more
flexible contract system.  Employment in the plan track has been virtually stationary -- it went
from 74.51 million in 1978 to 83.61 million in 1994.
4.  Developing Firms: Non-Conventional Ownership Form of Township-Village Enterprises
Ownership reform of firms is a central issue in transition to market.  The Eastern
European experience in ownership transformation has the following pattern.  In the earlier
reforms (prior to 1990), there was a lack of development of non-state enterprises and a lack of
privatization of state-owned enterprises, both were thought responsible for the reform failure.  In
the post-1990 transition, mass privatization of state enterprises became the cornerstone of the
reform, and in many cases, it was a political mandate.  Evidence shows that new entry private
firms, rather than privatized state firms, have been the driving force for recovery and growth.
New entry firms have been also the driving force of China’s growth.  But China differs
from Eastern Europe and most other developing economies in an important aspect: in the first
fifteen years of reform between 1979 and 1993, most new entry Chinese firms were neither
private firms nor state firms (i.e., national government firms), but local government firms.  As
Table 3 shows, private enterprises played only a minor role: in 1993 they contributed to less than
15 percent of the national industrial output.  In contrast in the same year, local government firms
contributed to 42 percent of the national industrial output.20
The most important segment of local government firms are Township-Village Enterprises
(TVEs) in rural areas, which numbered 1.5 million with employment of 52 million in 1993.  The
TVE shares of output and employment in rural industry were 72 percent and 58 percent
respectively, the rest being private shares.  Although TVEs were being privatized and private
firms became the engine of growth in the late 1990s, China's reform performance would look
very different without the early contributions of TVEs.  Thus, in order to understand how reform
worked in China, one has to understand TVEs.
The crucial feature of TVEs is the local community (i.e., township or village) government
control of firms, in contrast with private or national government control (Chang and Wang, 1994;
Li, 1996; and Che and Qian, 1998a).  But, given the obvious costs associated with government
intervention, what are the comparative advantages of community government ownership over
private ownership?
One of the most salient institutional features in China (and in many developing countries
as well) is the absence of rule of law to protect private property rights.  Combined with strong
anti-private property ideology that inherited from the central planning era, private property rights,
both cash flow and control over assets, are not secure.  Indeed, the state has attacked private
enterprises during several general political crackdowns after the reform, which include the “anti-
spiritual pollution campaign” of 1983, the “anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign” of 1987, and
most recently, after the Tiananmen Square of 1989.  Therefore it is not surprising that private
firms were under-developed because of the absence of legal protection of private property rights.
In such an institutional environment the property rights of local government-owned firms,
such as TVEs, can be more secure than those of private enterprises because of the protection of21
community governments.  In some countries the national government relies on local governments
for votes.  The political support provided by the local governments makes them useful to the
national government, which could the basis of power of local governments.  But under the
China’s political system rural community governments do not vote or elect the national
government.  Their support for the national government takes a different form -- providing local
public goods, such as maintaining order, building roads, providing water and irrigation system,
and implementing family planning.  These local public goods have both political and economic
dimensions.  For example, maintaining order provides political support to the national
government, at the same time it is also conducive to local business development.
Because the local community government engages in the activity of providing local
public goods, the interests of the national government will potentially be more aligned with those
of the local governments than with those of a private enterprise owner.  Indeed, when the local
government controls TVEs, it will become more useful to the national government than private
owners.  The following arguments show that, as a result, the national government may be more
friendly toward TVEs than private enterprises and therefore, property rights of TVEs become
endogenously more secure than those of private enterprises in the absence of rule of law (Che
and Qian, 1998b).
Ownership of firms provides owners with control over firms’ books and accounts, which
allows the owner to hide and receive unobservable parts of the revenue.  This provides the owner
with incentives in a credible way when revenue-based contracts are credible in the absence of
rule of law.  In the case of private ownership it is the manager who has the control rights and
receives unobservable revenue.  Worrying about the possibility of government predation, private22
owners rationally make excessive revenue hiding by choosing short term or liquid projects.  This
provides incentives to managers but also incurs revenue hiding costs.  When the manager has the
control rights over the firms, the local government loses the control.  Then the local government
would not have the incentives to provide local public goods because it cannot be sure to be able
to reap the future benefits.
In the case of local government ownership it is the local government who has the control
rights and receives unobservable revenue.  When the local government runs a business,
ownership and control rights interact with government activities and generate two effects that are
absent under private ownership.  First, the local government would have higher incentives in
providing local public goods because its ownership rights give it access to the future revenue in a
credible way.  Second, anticipating this, the national government would leave bigger budget to
the local government and thus optimally prey less on TVEs than on private enterprises.  This in
turn makes the local government less worried about revenue confiscation and reduces TVE
revenue hiding.  Both effects improve efficiency.
Both economic and political rationale work in the ownership form of TVEs.  TVEs not
only have contributed to growth, but also served the interests of national and local governments. 
The crucial linkage is the role of local government in providing local public goods.  There is
evidence suggesting such a linkage.  The national government has stipulated that the TVE after-
tax profits should be essentially used for two purposes: reinvestment and provision of local
public goods.  Nationwide in 1985 about 46 percent of the after-tax profits of TVEs were
reinvested, and 49 percent were used for local public expenditure.  In 1992, 59 percent of the
after-tax profits of TVEs were reinvested and 40 percent were used for local public expenditure23
(A Statistical Survey of China, 1992; 1993).
Does the TVE ownership, relative to private ownership, serve better the interests of the
national and local community governments in terms of tax revenue?  From the panel data of 28
provinces between 1986 and 1993, the relationship between ownership forms and fiscal revenues
of local and national governments have been estimated (Jin and Qian, 1998).  The main findings
are that, in rural China, the share of TVEs relative to private enterprises in a province has a
positive association with the revenue shares of the national and especially the township and
village governments, after controlling for the level of per capita income and other geographic
variables.  Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of TVEs relative to private
enterprises in the total rural non-agriculture employment (i.e., TVEs plus private enterprises) is
associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the revenue share to the national government. 
Considering that the mean of the national share is 7.3 percent, the national government benefits
from TVE ownership in terms of fiscal revenue in a significant way.  Moreover, a 10 percentage
point increase in the share of TVEs is associated with a 2.4 percentage point increase in the
revenue share to township and village governments.  This is an even more significant effect,
given that the mean of the township and village government revenue share is 8.2 percent.  These
results indicate that local government ownership not only provides higher revenues to both the
national and township and village governments, but also makes proportionally more revenue stay
in rural areas rather than going to the urban areas.
From the perspective of fiscal institutions, the above results reveal other interesting
implications of TVE ownership.  One of the common institutional problems in developing and
transition countries is an inadequate taxation system for generating tax revenue for the24
government and a good fiscal system to use the revenue.  On the revenue side, all transitional
economies have been experiencing sharp government revenue shortfalls because of the erosion of
monopoly profits from SOEs and the greater difficulty in taxing new private firms.  In a centrally
planned economy, taxation is simple: the government uses distorted prices to concentrate most
surpluses to the final industrial sectors and extracts revenues from them.  After the liberalization
of prices and ownership, profits are more equally distributed among different sectors and the
government loses revenue bases, especially in enterprises it does not control (McKinnon, 1993). 
The fiscal collapse is one of the major reasons behind the recent Russian crisis.  On the
expenditure side, the governments in developing countries often bias the use of revenue toward
certain groups in urban areas for political economy reasons (Bates, 1987).  After revenue is
collected, the government is often unable to commit the spending to local public goods in rural
areas in the presence of stronger political lobbying from the urban elites.
Both problems hurt rural industrialization and development.  Local government
ownership of TVEs can work in mitigating both problems.  With the ownership and control
rights over firms, the local government has a less costly way to extract revenues from these firms
than from private firms because the latter control their own financial accounts.  For the same
reason, when local governments control firms, it is harder for the central government to extract
revenue from them, and thus revenue is more likely to stay in the local areas.  The above
evidence shows that the role of TVE ownership to some extent substitutes for the problematic
fiscal system: on the revenue side, it allows for some revenue extraction despite the lack of
effective taxation system at the time of general tax revenue decline; on the expenditure side, it
also commits a large proportion of revenue to staying in the rural areas without being25
redistributed by the national government to the urban areas.
The ownership of TVEs is an example of how existing institutions can be utilized and
modified to serve the new purpose of development.  The root of TVE organization is the
agricultural commune system initiated in 1958.  The commune system was a huge failure in
agriculture production which was responsible for the more than 20 million death in the greatest
famine in human history in the early 1960s.  The same organizational structure of the commune
also bred the Commune and Brigade Enterprises, the predecessor of TVEs.  They were the
driving force for the first wave of rural industrialization in 1958, but was no success on
themselves.  Operating on the fringe of the central planning, they pushed for a moderate success
in the second wave of rural industrialization in the 1970s.  Commune and Brigade Enterprises
were renamed as TVEs in the 1980s and became the engine of growth and the driving force for
the market-oriented reform.  This illustrates the complexity of institutional development.  The
same local government ownership became something phenomenal only in a particular time
period under particular circumstances with complementary changes in other aspects of the
economy.  The fact that TVEs are being privatized in the 1990s is another reminder that one
should not take a static view on institutional reforms.  There is no fool-proof way of
recommending a particular institution.
5.  Reforming the Government: Productive Fiscal Federalism
Economists working on transition used to focus on the trilogy of stabilization,
liberalization, and privatization.  But they increasingly realized that an important missing
component in this menu was the government.  Even in an economy that has been stabilized,26
liberalized, and privatized, there is no guarantee that growth will ensue.  A crucial determinant of
growth is the behavior of government, especially that of local governments which often have
direct regulatory authority over new, small enterprises.  In one way, local governments can be a
“grabbing hand” vis-a-vis private enterprises; in another way, they can be a “helping hand”
(Shleifer, 1997).  To some extent, whether local governments play “grabbing hands” or “helping
hands” depends on their incentives.  In many ways the incentives of local government officials
can be structured.  One aspect that has important bearings on the incentives of local governments
is the their fiscal relationships with higher level government.
A comparison between China and Russia is relevant.  Both are large countries, and thus
the central-local relationship is an important issue for reform, which is quite different from
smaller transition countries like Poland and Hungary.  Arguably, Russia has implemented more
reforms in the areas of price and trade liberalization and privatization than China.  Nevertheless
local governments in Russia are often blamed for being the obstacles to local development.  In
contrast, local governments in China have been viewed as being very enthusiastic in supporting
local development and helping local businesses.  Why the difference?  The difference cannot be
attributed to that China has developed better rule of law than Russia.  One plausible explanation
is the local government’s fiscal incentives.
An important, innovative reform in China has been a fiscal reform concerning the central-
local relations, which started as early as in 1980.  Before the reform, the shares of local
government expenditure in total government expenditure were 46 percent during 1971-75 and 50
percent during 1976-80.  After the reform, the shares were 51 percent during 1981-85 and 60
percent during 1986-90.  After excluding price subsidies during 1986-90 to make the data27
comparable to previous periods, the shares of local spending came down to about 50 percent. 
Therefore, the aggregate local-central spending ratio has been basically the same before and after
the reform.  However, the share of local government expenditure itself does not capture the
important elements of reform and decentralization in China for two reasons.  First, prior to the
reforms, local governments had no authority over the structure of their expenditures.  After the
reforms, local governments acquired authority over expenditures within a broad set of guidelines
set by the central government.  Provinces also gained the authority to decide on the fiscal
arrangements with the sub-provincial governments within them.
Second, China's decentralization involved more than just the devolution of government
authority.  It also involved changes introduced between 1980 and 1993 in the fiscal incentives for
local governments through the so-called “fiscal contracting system.”  Government revenue in
China falls into three categories: budgetary funds, extra-budgetary funds, and off-budget funds. 
The off-budget funds are not recorded, so little can be said about them.  Extra-budgetary revenue
consists of tax surcharges and user fees levied by the central and local government's agencies as
well as earnings from SOEs.  The extra-budgetary local revenues are not subject to sharing with
the central government but the budgetary revenues are.  Up to 1994, all budgetary revenues
except custom's duties were collected by local governments.  In 1980, reforms put into place the
new fiscal system known by the nickname “eating from separate kitchens.”  This system
represents a dramatic departure from the previous system of “unified revenue collection and
unified spending,” known as “eating from one big pot.”
Under the new system, the central and provincial budgetary revenue and expenditures
were determined in the following way (Wong, 1997).  First, central fixed revenue was defined to28
include custom's duties, direct taxes or profit remittances from the central government supervised
SOEs and some other taxes.  All other revenue falls under the heading “local revenue.”  Second,
the local revenue was divided between the central and provincial governments according to pre-
determined sharing schemes.  Examples of these pre-determined sharing schemes include:
between 1980 and 1987, Guangdong province would remit a fixed amount of 1 billion yuan per
year; and between 1988 and 1993, it would remit a fixed amount per year, which increased by 9
percent per year.  Guizhou province would receive fixed subsidies which increased by 10 percent
per year.  On the other hand, Jiangsu province would remit a fixed share of revenue to the central
government.  Over time, many provincial governments retained 100 percent of the total local
revenue at the margin, which effectively made them residual claimants.  Figure 1 displays the
average of the provincial marginal revenue retention rates and the share of provinces with 100
percent marginal retention rates.  It shows that in the early 1990s, provinces retained nearly 90
percent of local revenues on average and about 70 percent of provinces became “residual
claimants” because they retained 100 percent of local revenue at the margin.
What are the motivations for introducing the fiscal contracting system?  There are two
stated purposes (Oksenberg and Tong, 1991).  First, the central government intended to guarantee
itself a certain flow of revenue from provincial governments.  Second, the central government
also wants to provide provincial governments with incentives to build up local economies and
their own revenue bases.  High fixed remission amounts and high marginal local revenue
retention rates apparently serve both purposes.
Two issues are relevant in examining how this reform worked in practice.  First, to what
extent had the provincial governments’ fiscal incentives been strengthened as the result of this29
reform?  Second, how did provincial governments respond to the fiscal incentives?
Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2001) have used the panel data of 28 provinces between 1982
and 1992 to answer these two questions.  Through the examination of the correlation between
local governments' revenue generated and their expenditures one can gauge the marginal fiscal
incentives of provincial governments.  As Table 5 shows, during the reform period between 1982
and 1991, the correlation coefficient between the provincial budgetary revenue and budgetary
expenditure is, on average, 0.75, and that for the extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure is as
high as 0.97.  These numbers imply that a one yuan increase in provincial budgetary revenue
results in about three-quarters of a yuan of provincial budgetary expenditure, and the relationship
becomes almost one to one for extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure.  In comparison, during
the pre-reform 1970-79 period, the corresponding coefficient between the budgetary revenue and
expenditure is, on average, 0.17.  It indicates that prior to the reform the central government, on
average, extracted over eighty percent of any increase in provincial revenues.  Comparing the
post-reform and pre-reform results, we find that the fiscal contracting system represents a drastic
departure from the past by allowing provinces to keep the lion's share of increases in revenue at
the margin.  Therefore, the new fiscal system indeed substantially enhanced the fiscal incentives
for local governments.
A comparison of these findings with parallel investigations in Russia is also revealing. 
Zhuravskaya (2000) examined the fiscal incentives of city governments in the region-city fiscal
relationship in post-reform Russia (city is one level below region, which in turn is one level
below the federal government).  Using the data of 35 cities for the period 1992-1997, and by
regressing the change in “shared revenues” between local and regional governments on the30
change of “own revenue,” she found that the coefficient was -0.90.  This estimation means that
increases in a city's own revenue are almost entirely offset by decreases in shared revenues from
the region to the city.  The resulting near-zero incentives in post-reform Russia looks similar to
the pre-reform China but stands in sharp contrast to the post-reform China.
The incentive theory tells us that if the central government takes away all the locally
generated revenue, the local government would have no incentives in supporting productive local
businesses because it cannot benefit from such an effort.  Conversely, if local governments'
expenditures are closely linked to the revenue they generate, the local governments will more
likely support productive local businesses as they benefit directly from their efforts.  The
empirical evidence found by Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2001) reveals that such incentive effects
do exist and are significant.  An increase in the marginal fiscal revenue retention rate in a
province by 10 percentage points is associated with an increase of 1 percentage point in the
growth rate of employment by non-state enterprises in that province.  This result holds when
“non-state enterprises” are measured by rural enterprises only and by all non-agriculture-non-
state enterprises, rural and urban.  Quantitatively these numbers are quite significant because the
mean of the growth rates of rural enterprise employment is 6 percent and that of all non-
agriculture-non-state employment is 9 percent.  Similar results are found for some reform
measurements in state-owned enterprises.  A 10 percentage point increase in the marginal
revenue retention rate in a province is associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in the share
of contract workers (as opposed to permanent workers) where the mean is 9 percent.  As for the
change of the share of bonuses in total employee wages, a 10 percentage point increase in the
marginal revenue retention rate is associated with a 0.15 percentage point increase in the share of31
contract workers where the mean is 15 percent.  These results imply that local fiscal incentives
are important inducement for local economic development and reform, more so for the former.
6.  Constraining the Government without Reducing Its Revenue
One of the fundamental institutional obstacles to economic development, according to
economic historians such as North, is the lack of institutional constraint on the powerful,
discretionary state.  When the state is not constrained, it faces a fundamental commitment
problem, that is, how to credibly commit not to prey on private gains or intrude on private
economic activities despite the great temptation to do so.  The lack of such commitment often
results in an excessive discretionary marginal tax rates which is detrimental to private incentives. 
Moreover, the state itself also suffers from its lack of commitment: when the discretionary
marginal tax rate is too high, the state is only able to grab little revenue because it is on the
downward sloping part of the Larffer curve.  While the rule of law is proven to be an effective
way of constraining the state in developed countries, China has not had it yet.
But there are other institutional arrangements that perform the similar function of
constraining the arbitrary behavior of the government in order to protect private incentives. 
When it is difficult to constrain the state power in a direct way, it may be possible to reduce the
effectiveness of the state power by reducing the information available it.  Bai, Li, Qian, and
Wang (1999) suggest that reducing information available to the state has played an important role
in constraining the government in China in the absence of rule of law.  This includes the
practices of anonymous business transactions through the use of cash and anonymous financial
assets through the use of anonymous bank deposits.32
In China there was a very tight control over the use of cash for business transactions
before the reform.  Any transaction of more than 30 yuan (about US$20) had to go through a
state bank.  During the reform, government controls were relaxed.  The ratio of cash in
circulation to GDP was less than 6 percent at the eve of reform in 1978, but increased to more
than 13 percent in the 1990s.  When a transaction is conducted in cash rather than going through
a state bank, the state obtains no information about the actual income earned through business
transactions.
Cash is not only useful for anonymous transaction but also for storing value in an
anonymous way.  Yet there is a more efficient way of accumulating wealth anonymously: the use
of anonymous household bank deposits.  In China, individuals making bank deposits need not
present personal IDs or register their real names.  As a result, the state banks cannot find out in
any way which deposits belong to whom.  As such, the state does not have the information about
individual’s financial wealth in the forms of cash and bank deposits.
The use of anonymous transactions and financial assets leads to a combination of income
and wealth hiding, which in turn sets credible limits to government taxation and thus preserves
private incentives.  The theoretical argument goes as follows.  Consider first the benchmark case
of information centralization under which the state observes all the income generated in the
economy.  For the ease of making argument, suppose an extreme case prevails in which the state
cannot make any credible commitment in the absence of the rule of law.  Then, the discretionary
ex post marginal tax rate of 100 percent will be imposed on all individuals' income because the
state has perfect information.  When individuals anticipate that the state is going to undertake
such discretionary taxation, and given that all revenues are observable to the state, individuals33
will have no private incentives to work or invest.  The result is a very low-efficiency equilibrium.
In contrast, under the regime of anonymous transaction and anonymous bank deposits as
described above, the state does not observe individual incomes nor savings but only aggregate
savings deposits.  This implies that the state cannot target particular individuals and thus can only
levy a flat tax on savings deposits.  Consider that even an autocratic government faces at least
one constraint -- the fear of rebellion from the poor and needy, and the government maximizes
revenue minus the cost associated with probable revolt.  However, the fear of rebellion itself is
not sufficient to constrain the state under good information, because the state can still avoid
rebellion from the poor by taxing at 100 percent marginal rate only on the rich.  Under
anonymous transaction and financial assets, the state is forced to tax the rich and the poor and
needy at the same flat rate.  Then there is a maximum amount the state can levy beyond which
the needy may starve and revolt.  As a result, anonymous transaction and financial assets would
impose an upper bound of taxation on savings deposits.  In this way, even in the absence of any
institution to explicitly constrain the government power, limiting the detailed information about
an individual's transactions and savings can credibly limit government predation.  This credible
commitment mechanism can enhance the security of private property rights that would otherwise
not possible.
The above analysis shows how reducing information available to the state improves
economic efficiency.  It is clear that this is in the interests of private entrepreneurs, but less clear
how this is also in the interests of the state.  Conceivably it could be against the interests of the
state if the state cannot tax anything.  The government could benefit from anonymous transaction
and financial assets by controlling over international capital flow and imposing restrictions on34
domestic interest rates.  Then the government is able to collect “quasi-fiscal” revenues from the
state banking system, despite the fact that it may well lose fiscal revenue in terms of income
taxes.  Through this type of financial repression, the government also benefits from information
opaqueness.
In summary, information opaqueness, together with financial repression, achieves two
goals at the same time: efficiency improvement and interest compatibility.  Foremost, it credibly
limits government predation by imposing upper bounds on explicit taxation on outputs and
implicit taxation on bank deposits.  This fosters private incentives.  Second, it also implies that
the lower bound on the implicit taxation on bank deposits is greater than zero so that the
government can collect some revenues from the state banking system.  This suits the
government's own interests.  Together, the institution of anonymous transaction and financial
assets, together with a mild financial repression, can limit government predation without
reducing its revenue.  While it does not reduce government revenue in absolute amount, it does
reduce the average tax rate because of the expansion of the pie of the economy as a result of the
improved private incentives.
Evidence from China reveals a general trend of fiscal decline together with financial
deepening after the reform.  The total (consolidated) government budgetary revenue as a
percentage of GDP declined sharply from 31 percent in 1978 to only 11 percent in 1996.  If one
includes extra-budgetary revenue and off-budgetary revenue, then the total government fiscal
revenue as percentage of GDP declined from about 40 percent in 1978 to 17 percent in 1996. 
Notice, however, that the absolute amount of fiscal revenue has been rising in real terms because
of the fast growth of the economy.  More precisely, real government budgetary revenue almost35
doubled in 20 years when the economy expanded by almost five-fold.  An important reason for
the decline of the government's fiscal revenue is not so much due to the formal reduction of tax
rates, but rather to the inability of the government to collect taxes, which is mainly due to private
revenue hiding from government observation.
However, government’s fiscal revenue is only a partial story, because the government has
another important “quasi-fiscal” revenue source from the state banking system.  Accompanying
the fiscal decline, there was an impressive financial deepening in China when individuals
voluntarily held cash and deposited money in the state banking system.  The ratio of household
bank deposits to GDP was merely 6 percent in 1978.  It went up to 56 percent in 1996 and further
to more than 65 percent in 1998.  This impressive financial build-up benefitted the government in
two ways: it collected revenue from both currency seigniorage and from implicit taxes on savings
deposits when interest rates were set below the market rate.  According to Table 6, between 1986
and 1994 currency seigniorage was averaged at about 3 percent of GDP each year, where about
1.2 percent was inflationary but 1.8 percent was due to the expansion of real money balance. 
Implicit taxes on bank deposits were about 2 percent of GDP each year on average, assuming a
zero interest rate as the opportunity cost of capital.  Then total quasi-fiscal revenue from the state
banking system (the central bank and state commercial banks) would be over 5 percent of GDP
each year.  Combining the fiscal and the quasi-fiscal revenues, total government revenue would
be more than 22 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s.  This may well be substantially less than that
in the pre-reform period, but does not represent a collapse of government revenue.
It is interesting to compare China again with Russia in this regard.  In both countries,
government fiscal revenue as shares of GDP declined dramatically, even more so in China than36
in Russia.  In both countries individual economic agents engaged in revenue hiding, but in Russia
individuals engaged in barter transactions while in China cash transactions.  In Russia, there was
high inflation and the government collected only a low level of seigniorage.  In fact, because of
the extensive use of US dollars and free international capital flow, the seigniorage in Russia went
into the Treasury Department in Washington and capital flew to Swiss banks.  In contrast, the
Chinese government was able to control inflation at a modest level and collected sizeable
seigniorage revenue through capital control and interest rate control.
Anonymous household bank deposits existed even before the reform.  This is not so much
that a new institution is created but that an existing institution finds its new use in a new
environment.  Because private economic activities were prohibited before the reform, private
savings were very low and the role of anonymous bank deposits in protecting private incentives
was limited at best.  Anonymous bank deposits become an important institution to protect private
interests only after the reform when the ban on private businesses was lifted and the use of cash
for business transaction becomes legal.  In fact, China learned about anonymous bank deposits
from the Soviet Union.  But unlike China, Russia abandoned them after the reform in order to
follow international “common practice.”  As a result, the mafia, colluding with the banks, was
able to obtain information about the depositors' wealth.  This is an important difference between
China's local government, which does not have information about depositors, and Russia's mafia,
which has this information.
7.  From Transitional Institutions to Best-Practice Institutions
During the transition from central planning to a market economy, markets need to be37
created and expanded, firms needs to be developed, and the government needs to be transformed. 
The previous four sections have provided four examples from China's experience showing how
innovative institutional reforms improve efficiency and benefit major decision makers and also
complement the existing institutions.  In the dual-track market liberalization, efficiency improves
because market prices play a role of resource allocation and reform is interest compatible because
existing rents are protected by the planned track.  In the example of TVEs, efficiency improves
because of more secure property rights for local government owned firms and local governments
have more incentives to provide more local public goods.  Both the national and local
governments’ interests are better served because TVEs provide more revenue, as compared with
private enterprises, to both.  Under the fiscal contracting system, the closer link between local
revenue generated and local government expenditures enhances the incentives of local
governments which in turn helps the development of local non-state enterprises and the reform of
state-owned enterprises.  In the final example, in the absence of the rule of law, anonymous
transaction and financial assets improve efficiency because they credibly constrain the state’s
discretionary behavior to better protect private incentives.  The state itself also benefits from the
improved private incentives when it is able to extract quasi fiscal revenues from the state banking
system through a mild financial repression.
However, the institutional forms in all the above four examples are better understood as
transitional institutions.  They are transitional because they incur higher costs and generate lower
benefits than some alternative institutions if other complementary institutions are in place.  The
costs of the dual-track liberalization include the cost of enforcing the planned track, the
consequence of failed enforcement such as supply diversion, and the possibility of ratcheting up38
the scope of the planned track.  The weak managerial incentives, together with costly government
intervention in TVEs, make them uncompetitive in the market place in the long run.  The fiscal
contracting system suffers from the renegotiation problem and perhaps makes macroeconomic
stability more difficult to achieve.  The information opaqueness resulting from anonymous
transaction and banking often facilitates corruption, detrimental to corporate governance, and
make it harder for introducing modern taxation.  Therefore, these institutions should not be
viewed as permanent and should eventually be replaced by the more conventional, best practice
institutions when the underlying environment improves.
The fact that best practice institutions are more efficient than transitional institutions does
not imply that the former should always prevail.  To the contrary, there are theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence from other countries showing the opposite.  Specifically, vested interests
who benefitted from transitional institutions may block further reforms of their replacement,
leading to a possible “partial reform trap.”  Hellman (1998) emphasized this possibility and
provided some evidence from Eastern Europe and Russia showing that it was the interim
winners, not the losers, of partial reform who blocked further reform.  However this is only one
of two possibilities.  Dewatripont and Roland (1992, 1995) and Wei (1997) demonstrated
another, more optimistic possibility in which a sequential reform strategy has important
advantages of building constituencies as well as momentum at the interim stage of reform for
further reform.  China’s experience has demonstrated that this latter possibility can hold and the
new vested interests do not necessarily block further reforms.  Three factors seem to facilitate the
effects of building up constituencies and momentum: the nature of  early reforms, the potential
gains from further reforms, and the compensation schemes for potential losers.  In what follows39
we examine each of the four examples above.
Since the early 1990s, the planned track of the dual track in product markets started to be
gradually phased out.  By 1996, the plan track was reduced to 16.6 percent in agricultural goods,
14.7 percent in industrial producer goods, and only 7.2 percent in total retail sales of consumer
goods.  These numbers became even smaller in the late 1990s and the planned track in those
markets almost ceased to exist.  On January 1, 1994, plan allocation of foreign exchange was
completely abolished, and the planned track and the market track were merged into a single
market track.  Two direct factors have contributed to the smooth transition to a single track
market.
First, because of the fast growth of the market track, the planned track becomes less
significant as compared to the market track.  For example, Table 3 shows that steel production
under planned track dropped to 30 percent in 1990 from the level of 52 percent in 1981. 
Similarly, In 1978, 97 percent of total retail sales were under the planned track, but only 31
percent in 1989.  In the foreign exchange markets, at the time when planned track of the foreign
exchange was finally abolished in January 1994, the share of centrally allocated foreign exchange
had already fallen to less than 20 percent of the total.  With rapid growth, the plan track becomes
a matter of little consequence to most potential losers, which in turn reduces the cost required for
compensating them.
Second, when the plan track was abolished, potential losers were explicitly compensated. 
For example, although consumers can buy foodstuffs in the market since 1980, urban food
coupons (for purchasing grain, meat, oil, etc.) were finally removed only in the early 1990s. 
Guangzhou completed the removal of the above coupons in 1992 and spent on average 103 yuan40
in 1988, 113 yuan in 1990, and 43 yuan in 1992 per urban resident for compensation (Guangzhou
Statistical Yearbook).  Beijing also spent 182 yuan in 1990, 185 yuan in 1991, and 123 yuan in
1994 per head before its removal of the coupons (Beijing Statistical Yearbook).  At the time of
abolishment of the central allocation of foreign exchange in 1994, annual lump-sum subsidies
sufficient to enable the purchase of the pre-reform allocation of foreign exchange, were offered
for a period of three years for those organizations which used to receive cheap foreign exchange.
After reaching the peak in the early 1990s, TVEs were being privatized throughout the
1990s.  Privatization of TVEs accelerated in 1998 after the Chinese Constitution was amended to
regard the private sector as “an important component” of the economy.  Wuxi in southern
Jiangxu Province was often regarded as the model for TVEs for the whole country, and it was the
subject of almost all major studies on TVEs, including the important one by the World Bank
(Byrd and Lin, 1990).  Until mid-1990s, TVEs was dominant in Wuxi and private enterprises
were almost non-existent.  Correspondingly, the income from TVEs was the chief revenue source
for the township and village governments there.  However, throughout the late 1990s, TVEs were
being privatized in all the three counties in Wuxi, and by the year 2000 over 90 percent of TVEs
have been privatized (author’s interview, March, 2001).
Three changes have played significant roles in increasing the gains from privatization of
TVEs and/or the costs for the local government to continue to run TVEs.  First, an important
benefit of TVE ownership is the political protection of local government against adverse
environment in order to secure property rights.  In the late 1990s, private ownership of
enterprises gained more legitimacy, as evidenced by the aforementioned Constitutional
Amendment and the increased share of private sector in the economy.  Therefore, the benefit of41
TVEs in terms of more secure property right decreases.  Second, the cost of TVE ownership,
mainly the lack of managerial incentives, became more important as the economy became
increasingly marketized and both product and labor markets competition intensified.  In the
product market, fast entry of firms changed the previous seller’s market to a buyer’s market,
eroding the profit margins TVEs enjoyed in the 1980s as early starters.  Indeed, in the 1990s, the
profitability of many TVEs deteriorated, while private enterprises started to boom in the same
location.  In the labor market, TVEs also started to lose good managers to foreign and joint
venture firms when the latter gave the managers high salary or even company shares.  Third, the
reforms in the monetary and banking systems made local bank branches more independent of
local governments.  TVEs found more difficulty in obtaining credit from the banking system.
The potential social gains from privatization will not automatically lead to privatization
unless the local governments have the incentives to do it.  As shown above, the significant
benefits of TVE ownership to local governments are the tax revenues they extract from TVEs. 
After privatization, the township and village governments were able to keep all the privatization
revenue, they are also able to continue to levy fees on all local private firms, usually 1.5 percent
of total sales.  This “local tax” is not shared with the higher level government, instead, township
and village governments usually pay a fixed amount.  Therefore, local governments support,
rather than oppose, to privatization out of their own interests.
China’s fiscal contracting system had played a positive role of providing fiscal incentives
for local governments.  But the fiscal contracting was an ad hoc arrangement and was not rule-
based.  On January 1, 1994, China introduced major tax and fiscal reforms which is more aligned
with international best practices.  Previously, China had never had a national tax bureau, and42
there was no such a need because all taxes were collected by local governments and shared with
the central government.  The 1994 reform established formal fiscal federalism by introducing a
clear distinction between national and local taxes and by establishing a national tax bureau and
local tax bureaus, each responsible for its own tax collection.  The reform also set up fixed rules
between the national and local governments.  For example, under the new system, the value
added tax is shared by the national and local government at a fixed ratio of 75:25.
Although the new tax and fiscal institutions are more in line with the international best
practice, they might potentially hurt the interests of some local governments because they kept
larger marginal shares of revenue under the previous fiscal contracting system.  Why did the local
governments accept such a change?  Although some local governments (such as Guangdong
province) benefitted tremendously from the earlier fiscal contracting system, they also recognized
that the ad hoc nature of the contracting system created many uncertainties and that the political
pressures from other provinces had increased.  The potential gain by moving to a rule-based tax
system instead of insisting on the ad hoc contracting system is in their long-term interests. 
Moreover, the central government compensated the local governments for their potential revenue
losses in the short run in the following way:  Local government expenditures in the subsequent
three years would be guaranteed to stay at the 1993 levels.  This is why in the fourth quarter of
1993 local expenditure exploded because local governments wanted to increase the base for the
compensation.  The move from the fiscal contracting system to fiscal federalism turned out to be
quite successful.
On April 1, 2000, China introduced “real name” household deposits under which all the
bank deposits require a depositor’s ID.  This is an important step in moving from anonymous43
banking to real-name banking, an international practice.  Like in Korea, this change was not so
much about increasing tax revenue, but to reduce political corruption by making the flow of
money transparent.  What is interesting is the particular way China introduced the real name
banking: It followed a dual track approach.  The real name policy only applies to the new
deposits made after April 1, 2000.  Withdrawing from the existing deposits, which amounted to
about 6 trillion yuan (or more than 60 percent of China’s GDP), continued to be anonymous. 
This drastically reduced the opposition to this reform.  By following the dual track approach, the
existing bank deposits were “grand fathered” and thus protected, and only the new deposits are
required to follow the new rule.
The Chinese experience of institutional changes shows the possibility that transitional
institutions can be superceded by conventional best practice institutions when more development
and reform take place.  Transitional institutions do not necessarily lead to a partial reform trap,
and incremental reforms do not always create obstacles to block further reforms.  However,
China’s experience also shows that this will not arise automatically.  It depends on the nature of
early reforms, future gains, and especially, compensation schemes.
8.  An Example of Failure: Reform of Large State-Owned Enterprises
The above sections analyzed how reforms worked in China through four examples of
success.  These reforms worked precisely because they found ways to improve economic
efficiency and at the same time to divide the pie to benefit all, especially those in power.  In one
notable area reform has not worked in China.  This is the reform of large-scaled state-owned
enterprises.  In this section we examine the troubled path of this reform, showing that how44
efficiency improving and interest compatible solutions failed to emerge.
Reforming state-owned enterprises has always been a priority of reform in China.  In fact,
SOE reform started in Sichuan province in October 1978, even before the agriculture reform, in
an experiment of expanding enterprise autonomy and introducing profit retention.  But the most
successful SOE reforms to date are perhaps privatization of small-sized SOEs and layoffs of
redundant employees in the mid-1990s.  Privatization of small-sized SOEs started by local
governments as experiments, first in a few provinces such as Shandong, Guangdong, and
Sichuan as early as in 1992 (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999).  Later, the central government
endorsed it under the policy of “grasping the large and releasing the small.”  Since 1995, millions
of redundant SOE workers have also been laid off.  After reaching a peak in 1995, the total state
employment in China (including both civil servants and SOE employees) started to shrink.  By
the late 1990s, it dropped to below 100 million, the level of the late 1980s.
However, the core of the SOE sector – the large-scaled state-owned enterprises – remains
a problem spot.  Many reforms were implemented but they did not work well or did not work at
all.  In the 1980s, the “managerial contract responsibility system” was introduced to provide
profit incentives for managers.  It had limited success by some measurements, for example, in
increasing the enterprise productivity (Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton, 1995).  But the
financial performance (i.e, profitability) of these enterprises continued to decline.  On average,
profits and taxes per unit of net capital stock and working capital in state industrial enterprises
fell from 24.2 percent in 1978 to 12.4 percent in 1990 and further down to 6.5 percent in 1996
(China Statistical Yearbook, 1997).  In the late 1990s, there were constantly more than one-third
of SOEs in red.45
In the 1990s, the focus of SOE reform shifted to ownership and governance issues, but it
still saw no breakthroughs.  Several failed attempts in the late 1990s were quite revealing.  Some
large SOEs were corporatized.  But they, including those already listed on China's two stock
exchanges, often suffered from the conflict between the so-called “three old committees” (i.e.,
the Party committee, the employee representative committee, and the workers union) and the
“three new meetings” (i.e., the meeting of shareholders, the meeting of board of directors, and the
meeting of the supervisory committee).  In some cases, the conflict between the Party secretary
and the CEO is so severe that it interferes an enterprise's normal operation.  In response, some
enterprises opted to place the same person in both positions of Party secretary and CEO.  But this
leads to another problem of insider's control.  To address this problem, starting 1998, hundreds of
external “special inspectors” were sent by the central government to large SOEs to supervise
their operations.  However, these inspectors were mostly retired high level bureaucrats who had
no knowledge about business operation and financial accounting.  Not surprisingly, they could
not play any constructive role in addressing the corporate governance problem.  Then the
government came up another solution by setting up a “Large Enterprise Working Committee”
within the Party's Central Committee to be responsible for making appointments of top managers
in large SOEs directly instead of going through different levels of bureaucracy.
So what is the problem?  The key problem is the Party’s control over the appointment of
SOE managers (Qian, 1996).  Although the past SOE reform adopted various reform policies, the
fundamental principle of the so-called “Party control personnel” remained unchallenged.  It is not
uncommon for the ruling Party to make political appointments for administrative posts.  But the
Party in China not only appoints cadres to administrative posts but also all the managers of state-46
owned enterprises.  The Party has exercised its control over the selection and dismissal of SOE
managers through its Organization Departments at different levels.  For example, the Central
Party Organization Department has the authority over appointments of the top managers of very
large SOEs (the level of minister or deputy minister), as does the Provincial or Municipality
Party Organization Department for most large and medium-sized SOEs (the level of bureau chief
or deputy bureau chief).  This authority applies to joint-stock companies as long as the state has
the majority share, even if they are listed on the stock market or are located in the special
economic zones.  The appointment and dismissal process represents the most important channel
of political influence over enterprises by the Party.
Under the Party control personnel system, SOE managers, like mayors, ministers, and
Politburo members, are political appointees of the Party.  This political process of managerial
appointments has serious problems.  First, the appointment process is politicized, secretive, and
complicated.  When the Party selects both managers and politicians at the same time, it may not
choose the people who are the right managers.  Second, the selection and evaluation methods are
based on information through bureaucratic rather than market channels such as the stock market,
rating companies, and investment banks.  Third, the Party bureaucrats have neither the ability nor
the incentives to make the right decisions on managerial selection according to business criteria
because they are mainly politically motivated.  It is interesting to compare SOEs with TVEs in
this regard.  Although TVE managers are appointed by township or village governments, they do
not go through the higher level Party apparatus because they are not “state cadres.”  Therefore,
they are not subject to the same political process as SOE managers.
With the Party acting as a “super owner,” corporate governance is hard to establish. 47
Corporate governance is a set of institutional arrangements governing the relationships among
investors (shareholders and creditors), managers, and workers.  The structure of corporate
governance concerns (1) how control rights are allocated and exercised; (2) how boards of
directors and top managers are selected and monitored; and (3) how incentives are designed and
enforced.  In other developed economies, major issues of corporate governance concern legal
rules limiting the agency problems, protecting shareholders and creditors, and providing room for
managerial initiatives.  The same problems arise in China, but with a special concern about the
role of the state as a large stakeholder.  Unless the state, institutional investors, and individual
investors are put on an equal footing, political intervention by the powerful government and the
Party will continue to plague the performance of these firms.
The SOE sector in China now accounts for about one-quarter of industrial output, but
more in such services as wholesale commerce, transportation, communication, and banking. 
Large-scaled SOEs still constitute the backbone of the economy.  The state sector continues to
place a disproportionally large claim on economic resources.  For instance, SOEs' share of bank
lending remained at near 60 percent by the end of 1998.  Although SOEs remain the main
revenue source for the government (they account for more than one half of total government
revenue), they also represent a big financial burden for it.  The poor financial performance of
SOEs is responsible for China’s banking sector problem.  Total non-performing loans may have
reached as high as 50 percent of GDP in 1999 before some of them being removed from the
banks’ balance sheets to the newly created “Assets Management Companies.”
Fortunately for China, the vibrant non-state sector has grown so fast that the problem of
the state sector becomes less critical.  Things would be different twenty years ago when the state48
sector constituted about 80 percent of total national industrial output.  But will China’s reform of
large-scaled SOEs (including privatizing them) eventually work?  The most recent government
policy on SOE reform adopted in September of 1999 intended to jump start the stalled reform
(China Daily, September 27, 1999).  The first, and perhaps most important, new policy is
“readjustment of the layout of the state economy” to narrow down its scope dramatically.  SOEs
are operating in almost all sectors of the economy, ranging from fighter plane production to hotel
operation, from book selling to toy making.  Committing the government to withdrawing from
most industrial and service sectors is a significant and encouraging step forward in transforming
the state sector in the economy.  The second new policy calls for the diversification of ownership
structure for those enterprises over which the state still wants to maintain control.  Except for a
few enterprises in which the state intends to retain 100 percent ownership, all other enterprises
will become joint stock companies with multiple owners.  These new owners can be either
domestic private investors or foreign investors, and the companies can be listed on the domestic
or foreign stock markets.  Examples include PetroChina listed on the New York Stock Exchange
and China Telecom (Hong Kong) listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Will the reform work this time?  As for the Party's role in corporate governance, the
recent policy on SOE reform sent out a mixed signal.  On the one hand, the government intends
to follow the international common practice in hiring, empowering, and rewarding top managers
for its enterprises, including giving them stocks.  On the other hand, the policy reiterated the
fundamental principle of “Party control personnel,” although it also mentioned that the “control
method” will improve.  The Party control gives the enterprise Party Committee extraordinary
power in making strategic decisions, and thus presents a fundamental problem in corporate49
governance.  In the coming years we will not be surprised to see frustrating contradictions at
every turns of corporate governance reforms.
9.  Concluding Remarks
This paper has demonstrated how novel transitional institutions of market, firms, and
government worked in China.  The institutional reforms achieved two objectives at the same
time: they are both efficiency enhancing and interest compatible.  The real challenge of reform
facing transition and developing countries is not so much about knowing where to end up but
about searching a feasible path toward the goal.  To understand how reform works in a country, it
is not enough to study the best-practice institutions as a desirable goal.  One should also study
how feasible, imperfect institutions fit the economic and political reality and function as stepping
stones in the transition process toward the goal.  The good news is that in these economies a large
room usually exists for efficiency improvement (that is why they need reforms in the first place). 
China’s experience has shown that there will be a time period in which impressive growth does
not require perfect institutions, and imperfect but sensible institutions can perform.  On the other
hand, China’s success in unconventional institutions does not constitute an argument against
fostering best practice institutions such as rule of law, private ownership of firms, and transparent
government.  It is an argument against simplistic and naive views on institutional reform.
As a whole, China’s reform experience is quite unique among developing and transition
economies.  However, each component of China’s reform may find resemblance in other
countries.  For instance, all the schemes involving various forms of “grand fathering” have a
resemblance to the Chinese dual-track approach.  The two-tier wage system with lower wages for50
newly hired employees and higher wages for existing employees has been used in some
industries such as the U.S. airline industry.  The dual-track also worked in the export zones in
Mauritius as documented by Rodrik (1999).  Although the huge scale of TVEs is unique to
China, successful firms in developing and transition economies in which the government holds
equity stakes are not unusual.  Moscow firms controlled by its Mayor or Indonesian firms that the
Suhato family holding substantial shares all enjoyed the comparative advantage of political
protection.  Giving equity stakes to the government does not guarantee growth, but it does align
the interests of the government with growth and sometimes helps growth in an environment
without a rule of law (see Lant Pritchett on Indonesia).  Anonymous banking is not unique to
China.  Korea, and even some developed countries in Europe such as Austria, had it for a long
time until recently, not to mention Switzerland where the entire banking industry is built upon it.
The thrust of the arguments in this paper, that is, institutional development needs to fit
into the initial conditions and to be made interest compatible for the ruling groups, also finds
parallels in other successful experiences, such as Botswana.  In contrast to most African
countries where institutions were imported and were significantly at odds with the indigenous
political culture and the political ambitions of the most powerful people, Botswana’s imported
institutions were largely consistent with the political ambitions of the powerful people.  The
success of Botswana is much due to the fact that good economics was also good politics (see
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s paper).  This is the common ground between China and
Botswana, despite the huge differences between the two successful growth experiences.
The country study of China’s growth experience highlights the context-specificity of what
worked and what not, which may not come out easily in cross-country regressions.  It allows us51
to use a richer set of information to bring out the insights on the diverse paths of good transition
and development.  China’s path of reform is filled with seemingly frustrating contradictions. 
Starting from misaligned prices, unproductive firms, and an overreaching government, the
inefficient economy had a large scope for improvement.  Unconventional solutions applicable to
developing and transition economies usually come from the people who have a stake in the
economy and have the information about its own initial conditions and history.
Our study does not predict the eventual success of China’s transition, but it does question
the prognosis that China’s reform is doomed to fail because it did not follow the conventional
wisdom.  Whether China 's present short march to a market economy muddles through or ends
like Indonesia of the late 1990s is still an unknown.  But nothing on this scale and within such
short a time period has ever been attempted in the history of the world.52
Table 1.  GDP Growth Rates by Province (percent)
Provinces 1978-90 1978-95 Provinces 1978-90 1978-95
Beijing 9.0 9.8 Henan 12.6 10.9
Tianjin 7.7 8.9 Hubei 9.4 10.5
Hebei 8.5 10.2 Hunan 7.7 8.7
Shanxi 8.2 8.8 Guangdong 12.3 14.2
Inner Mongolia 9.8 13.0 Guangxi 7.2 9.9
Liaoning 8.1 8.8 Hainan 10.1 12.3
Jilin 8.9 9.5 Sichuan 8.6 9.5
Heilongjiang 4.9 4.8 Guizhou 9.2 9.1
Shanghai 7.4 9.1 Yunan 9.7 9.9
Jiangsu 11.0 12.8 Tibet 7.7 8.3
Zhejiang 11.7 13.8 Shaanxi 9.0 9.1
Anhui 9.3 10.7 Gansu 8.2 8.6
Fujian 11.5 13.7 Qinghai 6.5 6.8
Jiangxi 9.0 10.4 Ningxia 9.2 8.9
Shangdong 10.0 11.9 Xinjiang 10.8 11.1
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.53
Table 2.  Growth Rates of GDP and GDP Components (percent)
Year GDP Agriculture Industry Tertiary
1979 7.6 6.1 8.2 7.8
1980 7.8 -1.5 13.6 5.9
1981 5.5 7.0 1.9 10.4
1982 9.1 11.5 5.6 13.0
1983 10.9 8.3 10.4 15.2
1984 15.2 12.9 14.5 19.4
1985 13.5 1.8 18.6 18.3
1986 8.8 3.3 10.2 12.1
1987 11.6 4.7 13.7 14.4
1988 11.3 2.5 14.5 13.2
1989 4.1 3.1 3.8 5.4
1990 3.8 7.3 3.2 2.3
1991 9.2 2.4 13.9 8.8
1992 14.2 4.7 21.2 12.4
1993 13.5 4.7 19.9 10.7
1994 12.6 4.0 18.4 9.6
1995 10.5 5.0 14.1 8.0
Notes: Data on industry includes construction.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.54
Table 3.  Dual Track Market Liberalization
Grain (million tons)
1978 1988
State procurement at plan price 47.8 50.5
State procurement at market price near 0 43.8
Total domestic production 304.8 394.1
Steel (million tons)
1981 1990
Plan quota 13.91 15.58




State permanent employees 74.51 83.61
State contract employees 0 28.53
Non-state employees 48.9 204.85
State permanent/total 0.60 0.26
Source: Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000).55
Table 4.  Industrial Output Share by Ownership (percent of total)
1978 1993
State firms 78% 43%
Non-state firms 22% 57%
   of which:
       Local government firms 22% 42%
       Private and other types firms 0% 15%
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.56
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Notes: (1) Each regression includes a full set of year dummies.
(2) Huber-White robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source:   Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2001).57
Table 6.  Currency Seigniorage and Implicit Taxation on Bank Deposits
(percent of GDP)














1986 0.7 1.5 2.2 1.33
1987 1.1 0.7 1.8 3.07
1988 0.9 3.9 4.8 1.12
1989 0.8 0.5 1.3 -0.09
1990 0.7 -0.7 -0.0 -1.11
1991 1.0 1.5 2.5 0.70
1992 1.7 3.0 4.7 5.61
1993 2.0 3.6 5.6 4.40
1994 1.9 3.3 5.2 4.43
Average 1986-94 1.2 1.8 3.0 2.10
Notes: Column (3): Equal to sum of Columns (1) and (2).
Column (4): A zero real interest rate is assumed as opportunity cost of capital. 
Inflation compensation for household term deposits maturing in over three years is
not taken in to account.
Source: Bai, Li, Qian, and Wang (1999).58
Figure 1.  Provincial Marginal Revenue Retention Rates (1980-92)
Notes: The upper line is the average of marginal retention rates.
The lower line is the share of the provinces with 100 percent marginal retention
rates.
Source:  Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2001).59
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